Britain needs to ditch its failing price-oriented regulatory model, not compound it by implementing Part 2 of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) Act
Britain has no shortage of ambition when it comes to digital infrastructure. Successive governments have championed the importance of fast, reliable 5G as the foundation for economic growth, productivity gains, and technological competitiveness. Yet despite this, the UK’s record on delivery continues to lag behind.
Recent analysis by MedUX placed London at the bottom of the 5G table among 15 major European capitals, with substandard performance on speed, reliability, and availability. Nationally, the picture is just as bleak: the Social Market Foundation ranks the UK 30th out of 39 countries for 5G availability, and 37th for quality. For a G7 economy with advanced telecoms infrastructure and high urban density, the scale of underperformance is striking.
Government policy is a blocker
Despite successive government’s vocal support, it is not the UK’s geography, demand, or technological capacity that is holding 5G back – it is government policy.
The reforms introduced in 2017 to the Electronic Communications Code (ECC), though well-intentioned, have had unintended consequences. The central change was a shift in how telecoms companies pay landowners to host mobile infrastructure. Instead of being based on market value, rents are now calculated using a ‘no-scheme valuation’ model – essentially quasi-compulsory purchase rules – meant to lower costs for operators and accelerate roll-out.
But over the past decade, this approach has disrupted the commercial relationship between telecoms firms and landowners, who now receive a fraction of previous rents, and in many cases, far below what they could expect from alternative uses such as renewable energy. This disruption has been further compounded by the evolution of the market structure itself.
The emergence of intermediary tower companies and wireless infrastructure providers (WIPs), who benefit from the Code’s valuation model but bear no network coverage obligations under Ofcom, has introduced a layer of complexity that further undermines landowners’ confidence and incentives.
Increased reluctance
Unsurprisingly, this has made landowners more reluctant to host masts, while also triggering a sharp rise in litigation. Since 2017, more than 1,000 court cases have been filed over telecoms infrastructure, compared to just 33 in the three decades prior. This surge in legal disputes has delayed roll-out, higher costs and uncertainty for both investors and public bodies.
Local authorities, NHS Trusts and public landowners are increasingly caught in the crossfire, as seen in the case of Hillingdon Hospital in Greater London. It was forced to repay over £300,000 to a mobile operator after losing a rent dispute at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic when healthcare systems needed every resource they could get.
A tougher act to follow
Despite mounting evidence that the current model is failing, the UK Government is preparing to proceed with implementing Part 2 of the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) Act – extending the existing regime to a further 15,000 sites. Though intended to accelerate rollout, this approach risks compounding past mistakes rather than correcting course in the face of growing evidence.
This is in stark contrast to the European Union, which has taken a different and arguably more effective approach. The EU’s Gigabit Infrastructure Act, passed in 2024, provides a more balanced system that encourages voluntary agreements between landowners and operators, underpinned by good-faith negotiation and market-reflective pricing.
It actively supports deployment through a mix of streamlined planning processes, co-financing opportunities and targeted subsidies, particularly in under-served areas. Crucially, no other country in Europe has adopted the UK’s price-oriented regulatory model for access to land, a decisive factor in explaining why the UK is falling behind.
The European Union’s framework is designed not just to reduce friction but to attract capital and accelerate delivery, and it will enlarge an already existing gap reflected in the recent white paper from Analysys Mason Access to Land under the GIA: Considerations for Regulation. European countries such as France, Germany, and Spain are pulling ahead in both availability and quality of 5G coverage. Denmark now delivers 5G access to over 80% of users; in the UK, it remains under 45%.
Regulatory freedom
What makes this comparison more pressing is that the UK now has the regulatory freedom to do things differently. No longer bound by EU frameworks, the UK has an opportunity to build a system tailored to its own growth ambitions – one that reflects both investors’ realities and local needs. Britain’s finance minister says removing barriers to investment is central to the government’s economic strategy. In the case of telecoms infrastructure, the barrier is regulatory, and it is entirely within our power to address.
There is a moment here for reflection and course correction. A pause on the implementation of Part 2 of the PSTI Act would allow policymakers to assess whether the current framework is fit for purpose. The weight of evidence suggests it is not.
Rather than speeding up deployment, the post-2017 regime has increased conflict, deterred investment and undermined the willingness of landowners – especially in the public and third sectors –to participate in the network expansion effort. Continuing to expand this system without review risks locking in underperformance at a time when infrastructure delivery has never been more important.
The UK could take the lead
The UK’s ambition to lead in digital infrastructure is still achievable. But delivering on that ambition will require policy that enables, rather than obstructs, the capital, cooperation and certainty needed to get Britain’s 5G roll-out back on track. That means using the freedoms we now have to rethink what works – and acting quickly before today’s problem becomes tomorrow’s entrenched failure.
